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1VASHINGTON CASE LAW-1955

a valuable consideration. But where, as here, the former shareholders also assume
the liabilities of the dissolved corporation, it was ruled that the real estate sales tax
is applicable to the extent of the liabilities assumed by the shareholders. Thus, the
former shareholders here paid the one per cent sales tax to the extent of the approximately one hundred thousand dollars worth of liabilities assumed by them.

COM1MUNITY PROPERTY
Tort Liability and Conflicts of Laws. In Maag v. Voykovichk ' a husband committed an assault in Alaska. At the time of the tort, the
husband was a Washington domiciliary. The suit was brought in
Washington, and the court assumed that the liability would have been
a community obligation had the tort been committed in Washington.
The court held, however, that since the tort was committed in Alaska,
the obligation was only against the individual husband, and not against
the marital community. While the reasoning of this decision is
supported by many Washington cases,2 the author submits that it is
incorrect, since it is based upon a semantic misinterpretation which
dates back to 1896.
The court's reasoning proceeds as follows: since the tort was committed in Alaska, we will adhere to the usual conflict of laws rule and
apply the law of Alaska.' In Alaska there is no marital community so
therefore we must employ the common law rule which would hold
only the husband's property liable for the tort. Because only the
property of the husband could be levied on to satisfy a judgment in
Alaska, we hold that only the husband's separate property in Washington can be so utilized, and therefore it is not a marital community
obligation.
The author believes that the semantic confusion comes in the use
of the word "separate." "Separate property" as used in Washington
doesn't mean the same as "husband's property" as used in Alaska. This
' 4
distinction is correctly pointed out by Judge Hill in his "concurring
opinion which relies strongly on the criticism of Marsh in his treatise
on marital property.'
146 W2d 302, 280 P.2d 680 (1955).

2 The only tort case is Mountain v. Price, 20 Wn.2d 129, 146 P.2d 327 (1944), but in
the contract area see Achilles v. Hoopes, 40 Wn.2d 664, 245 P.2d 1005 (1952) ; Meng v.
Security State Bank, 16 Wn.2d 215, 133 P.2d 293 (1943) ; La Selle v. Woolery, 14
Wash. 70, 44 Pac. 115 (1896), and other cases cited in the majority opinion of the Maag
case.
3RLESTATEMfENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
4 Judge Hill concurs in the result on the basis of stare decisis only. His opinion is
a dissent against the reasoning employed by the court and the result reached in these
cases.
5MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS

146 (1952).
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This misuse of "separate" began in the much criticized case of
La Selle v. Woolery.6 In that case the court held that a Washington
judgment against a married man domiciled in Washington, on a debt
created in Wisconsin, could not be collected out of the defendant's
community property. The reason given was that the debt, by Wisconsin law, was a separate, individual debt of the husband. The Wisconsin law, correctly interpreted, meant simply that the property of
the wife would not be liable for such a debt. From this the Washington
court reasoned that only the separate property of the husband would be
liable.
The fallacy lies in considering what constitutes separate and community property in various jurisdictions. While the wages of a husband
would be considered his "separate"' property in Wisconsin, they
would be community property in Washington. Thus, property used
to satisfy a Wisconsin judgment, namely, everything but the wife's
"separate" property, should also be used to satisfy the same judgment
in Washington. Hence, in Washington community property should
be liable.
After the LaSelle case in 1896, came a number of similar debt and
contract cases in which the court followed the LaSelle case.' In
Mountain v. Prices the problem was first presented in the tort field.!
The court applied the same reasoning it had used in the contract cases
and again held the community not liable on the judgment against the
husband. Thus, while the Maag case is certainly consistent with other
Washington cases, the author believes that this also was an incorrect
decision.
The line of reasoning which the court has adopted will present
further problems when the converse of this situation is presented.
Suppose a case in which a husband, domiciled in Washington, collects
a judgment in Alaska. Later the question arises whether this is
separate or community property in Washington. Characterizing this
problem as one of marital property, the law of the state in which the
husband was domiciled would prevail. Therefore, the court would be
led to holding this money to be community property since it would be
property acquired after marriage and not acquired gratuitously.
614 Wash. 70, 44 Pac. 115 (1896).
7Actually the term "separate" is not used in non-community property jurisdictions.
Those jurisdictions refer only to the husband's property. The term "separate" is added
here to show the distinction as the Washington court views it.
8 Cases cited note 2 supra.

920 Wn.2d 129, 146 P.2d 327 (1944).
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Washington would then be faced with this inconsistency: a judgment
against a Washington husband in another jurisdiction could only be
collected out of his separate property in Washington, while a judgment
for the very same husband would be community property. This latter
situation has not yet arisen in Washington. When the problem does
arise, assuming the solution as outlined above, this inconsistency will
further demonstrate the court's incorrect stand in the Maag case.
As both Marsh" and Judge Hill" suggest, the problem is one of
"characterization" of the defense that the community property is not
liable for the individual obligations of the husband. The court has
failed to realize that the "characterization" problem is twofold. First,
there is a question of fixing liability. In answering this, the Washington
court properly applies the law of the place of the tort. Having determined which law to use in solving this issue, the court continues to
apply the same law in deciding the liabilty of the community.
This reasoning is fallacious since the latter involves a second problem
of 'characterization." The question of community property liability
is one of marital property and is separate from the issue of fixing
liability. Marital property problems are governed by the law of the
state of domicile of the husband and wife, which in this case is Washington, not Alaska. Were this defense correctly "characterized," it
would lead to the desired result whereby the marital commuity would
be liable on the obligation in every instance where the husband was
domiciled in Washington when the cause of action arose.
The solution in this field may be accomplished in two ways. The
first would be for the court to apply the reasoning suggested by Marsh,
reverse the previous cases, and arrive at the more just result. In view
of the court's strong adherence to the principle of stare decisis and
the number of cases already decided in this area, the author feels that
the result will not be accomplished in this manner. However, as Marsh
suggests," decisions like Mountain v. Price, where the plaintiff was
suing to enforce an Oregon judgment against the individual, might be
successfully attacked under the due process clause as an arbitrary and
capricious discrimination against a foreign cause of action. This argument has never been presented to the court.
The other solution, which Judge Hill mentions," is one of legislative
10 IARSH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 147.
1146 Wn.2d 302, 306, 280 P2d 680, 682 (1955).
12 A
fRSH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 152. In the contracts field the recent case of
Achilles v. Hoopes, 40 Wn.2d 664, 245 P.2d 1005 (1952), could also be attacked on
the same ground.
is46 Wn.2d 302, 307, 280 P.2d 680, 682 (1955).
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action. This appears to be the most feasible answer and the one with
the most chance of success. Were the problem presented to the legislators, the unjustness of the present rule could be readily seen and
corrected.
In conclusion, it is the opinion of the author that the court has failed
to recognize the distinction between "husband's property" as used in
non-community property jurisdictions and "husband's separate property" as used in Washington. Further, correct analysis of this problem
in the future will require that the court distinguish the two questions
of "characterization" which are involved. Therefore, it follows that
Marsh's position is the correct one and should be used in analyzing
cases dealing with the problem.
WILLIAm H. MAYS
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Declaration of Homestead-Excess Value Subject to Judgment
Lien-Good Faith Declaration. In the case of Barouk v. Israll,'
H declared a homestead under facts which made it doubtful that the
declaration was made in good faith. H later entered into an agreement
to sell the property to P for $7,000.' A judgment was subsequently
entered in favor of D against H. H then conveyed the property to P
who did not have actual knowledge of the judgment. D then procured
a writ of execution and levied on the property. P brought this action
to quiet title and to enjoin the sale; a permanent injunction was
granted. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.
The court held that since there was a declaration of homestead on
file the judgment creditor of the grantor did not have a lien on the
property and, since the land had been conveyed to a bona fide
purchaser,' the judgment creditor could not contest the validity of
the declaration.
146 Wn.2d 327, 281 P.2d. 238 (1955).

2 The court apparently attached no legal significance to this point and it was not
discussed in the opinion. The writer will likewise ignore the point but it raises some
interesting questions. Was this agreement a valid executory contract for the sale of the
property? If it was, then the subsequent docketing of the judgment does not give the
vendee notice and he can continue paying the vendor and is entitled to the benefits of
these payments until he receives actual notice of the judgment. Heath v. Dodson, 7
Wn.2d 667, 110 P.2d 845 (1941). If it was not a valid contract, then the docketing of
the judgment gives constructive notice to the vendee and he is not entitled to the
benefits of payments made after the judgment was docketed. See RCW 4.64.010.
Assuming it was a valid contract, a judgment lien still attaches to the actual interest
of the vendor but the judgment does not affect the rights of the vendee. McDonald v.
Curtis, 119 Wash. 384, 205 Pac. 1041 (1922).
3 It is submitted that there is considerable doubt that P was a bona fide purchaser.
See RCW 4.64.010 et seq., which provides that after a verdict has been recorded

